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1. INTRODUCTION 
Massive capital flows have become a hallmark of the international economy and one of the 
most conspicuous symptoms of globalisation in the last decade of the XXth century.  
Supported by financial liberalisation and deregulation, increased openness of individual 
economies, and rapid technological progress in communication, capital flows have moved 
between developed countries and from developed to developing countries, including the 
emerging economies of central and east Europe, in search of attractive investments and high 
rates of return.  Poland is not an exception to this tendency.  Capital inflows to the Polish 
economy have increased rapidly during last years, contributing to the country’s development 
potential through new investments and technology transfers, but at the same time strongly 
affecting monetary and external balance and complicating macroeconomic policy. 
The purpose of the paper is to make an overview of capital inflows to Poland, to examine 
its impact on monetary and exchange rate policy and to suggest policy recommendations.  
The next section summarises basic facts and figures concerning capital inflows and discusses 
the main factors behind the rapid increase of inflows after 1994.  The following section 
investigates the implications of capital inflows for monetary and exchange rate policies under 
different monetary and exchange rate policy rules.  In Section 4, a simple analytical 
framework is used to examine the consistency of an “eclectic” monetary policy rule under 
capital mobility.  It is demonstrated that the “eclectic” rule is largely ineffective in fighting 
inflation under large capital inflows and may even lead to perverse results.  The last section 
discusses problems and policy options on the road to EU and EMU membership.  It is argued 
that the requirement to meet the set of the so-called “Maastricht criteria” poses serious 
challenges before the Polish economy, and that appropriate policies should aim at maintaining 
maximum flexibility as long as possible before the country can join the EMU. 
2. CAPITAL INFLOWS TO POLAND: AN OVERVIEW 
2.1. Facts and Figures 
The history of capital inflows to Poland after the transition started in 1989 covers two 
distinctively different periods.  Between 1990 and 1994, capital inflows remained very 
modest and their impact on monetary and real sectors of the economy insignificant.  Since 
1995 capital inflows have sharply increased, strongly adding to domestic investment and 
contributing to country’s economic development but at the same time seriously complicating 
the monetary and exchange rate policies.   
When the ambitious market reform program was initiated in 1989-1990, Poland did not 
have regular access to international financial markets.  The country, heavily indebted after the 
failed attempt in the 1970s to modernise the economy and speed up economic growth through 
heavy reliance on massive foreign credits, fell into a debt trap and unilaterally suspended 
servicing its debt owed to official creditors (the Paris Club creditors) as early as in 1980. The 
default and the lack of a formal agreement on debt restructuring with the Paris Club countries 
severely restricted Poland’s possibilities to resort to international financial markets to 
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overcome the economic crisis in the late 1980s and in the initial years of transition.  The only 
external resources available to Poland at that time was the IMF stand-by support program, 
limited concessionary assistance from the ECE countries and the Stabilisation Fund to 
support the Polish currency1.  By contrast, the policy with respect to private creditors (the 
London Club) was deliberately different.  Poland continued to pay all due interest charges 
while rolling over the principal amount of debt.  This consistent policy of honouring its 
obligations to international commercial banks paid off as Poland was able at least to finance 
its current foreign trade transactions.   
The successful launching in 1989-1990 of the program of market and democratic reforms 
helped to change the attitude of foreign investors towards Poland.  Prices and foreign trade 
were radically liberalised, the national currency was stabilised and made convertible for most 
of current account transactions, and business activities deregulated.  Combined with 
democratic reforms, these systemic and policy changes opened way for foreign capital to 
gradually return to Poland.  
One measure of the magnitude of capital inflows are the changes in gross official 
international reserves (GOR) of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and in net foreign assets 
of the banking sector (NFA). As Figure 1 shows, capital inflows initially remained limited.  
Under the fixed exchange rate regime in 1990-1991, and the rigid crawling peg regime that 
followed during 1991-1994, the NBP intervened routinely in the foreign exchange market, 
buying and selling foreign currency at predetermined rates and sterilizing the monetary 
impact of the changes in international reserves.  Before 1995 those operations involved rather 
limited amounts of foreign exchange, as outward capital mobility remained restricted while 
capital inflows were relatively insignificant. Under the regime of sterilised interventions 
capital inflows were almost entirely converted into increasing international reserves of the 
central bank.  
                                                 
1  The Stabilisation Fund of USD 1 bn was established at the initiative of the United States by the OECD 
member countries at the end of 1989.  It was supposed to back the fixed rate of the Polish złoty in the initial 
stage of stabilisation program.  Not a single dollar was ever used for that purpose because the stabilisation 
operation proved surprisingly successful.  In 1995-96 the resources of the Fund were used to support the 
reform of the banking sector in Poland.  
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Figure 1   
Gross international reserves and net foreign assets in Poland, 1989-2001  
As shown in Table 1, gross official reserves almost doubled in the first year of transition, 
but only from the extremely low level in 1989.  In the following four years between the end 
of 1990 and the end of 1994 international reserves increased only by 25% from USD 4.7 bn 
to 5.8 bn. Only after 1994 did capital inflows accelerate strongly: between 1994 and 1998 the 
level of reserves jumped up from USD 5.8 bn to 27.4 bn, i.e. almost five times in four years.  
The increase in NFA in that period was less pronounced but also very substantial (2.4 times).  
After 1998 the level of GOR stabilised in result of the change in the monetary and foreign 
exchange regime. 
Table 1  
International reserves in Poland, 1989-2000 (USD mln, end of period) 
Year Gross Official Reserves Net Foreign Assets 
 a) b) 
1989 2503 3628 
1990 4680 7822 
1991 3614 6505 
1992 4287 8552 
1993 4281 8755 
1994 5839 11289 
1995 14963 20436 
1996 18033 21667 
1997 20670 24443 
1998 27382 27484 
1999 27314 26690 
2000 27464 31863 
a) of the National Bank of Poland 
b) of the consolidated banking system 
Source: National Bank of Poland 
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The composition of capital inflows after 1994 is shown in Figure 2 and Table 2.  As can be 
seen, the importance of individual inflow categories changed over time.  Annual net inflows 
of FDI were growing steadily, from USD1.1 bn in 1995 to 9.3 bn in 2000.  Portfolio inflows 
fluctuated much more widely but remained positive in every year. The most volatile 
component was “other capital inflows” (including foreign credits and changes in bank 
accounts) that reached the peak of USD 6.3 bn in 1998, but then fell sharply to a net outflow 
of USD 4.2 bn in 2000.  On balance, the net cumulative inflows of FDI between end-1994 
and end-2000 were USD 27.4 bn and largely exceeded the cumulative portfolio inflows and 
other capital inflows (9.1 bn and 9.6 bn, respectively).  The total amount of net capital 
inflows to Poland in that period reached almost USD 46 bn, with FDI accounting roughly for 
60% of the total.  
Figure 2   
Cumulative capital inflows to Poland, by main categories, mln USD, Jan 1995-Jun 2001 
 
Table 2  
Capital inflows to Poland, by main category, 1995-2000 (mln USD and as % of GDP) 
Year Capital inflows in mln USD Capital inflows as % of GDP 
 FDI Portfolio Other FDI Portfolio Other 
1995 1134 1171 2675 0.89 0.92 2.10 
1996 2741 241 2040 1.91 0.17 1.42 
1997 2941 2098 2471 2.06 1.52 1.42 
1998 4966 1331 6259 3.13 0.84 3.95 
1999 6348 1449 409 4.09 0.93 0.26 
2000 9299 2850 -4244 5.85 1.83 -2.67 
Source: National Bank of Poland, own calculations. 
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Table 2 also shows the capital inflows as proportion of GDP.  Again the share of FDI has 
been increasing steadily from less than 1% in 1995 to almost 6% of GDP in 2000.  The other 
components of capital inflows were significantly less important (except “other capital 
inflows” in 1998 that amounted to almost 4% of GDP).  The ratio of total inflows to GDP 
increased sharply from around 3.5% in 1996 to 8% in 1998, but then fell to 5%. The high 
proportion of FDI makes capital inflows to Poland less volatile than in other countries, 
provides solid financing for current account deficit, and significantly reduces the risk of a 
sudden withdrawal of capital.  Moreover, it also considerably increases Poland’s growth 
potential2.  
2.2. Institutional Factors Behind Capital Inflows to Poland: Debt Restructuring, 
Market Reforms and EU and OECD Accession 
The sharp acceleration of capital inflows after 1994 was caused by a number of factors that 
can be generally be classified into two categories: institutional measures and macroeconomic 
developments.  Probably the most important one was the debt reduction agreement with 
official and private creditors.  After long and protracted negotiations Poland signed in 
September 1994 the debt-restructuring agreement with the Paris Club creditors, and in 
December 1994 with commercial banks.  Both agreements provided for a 50% reduction of 
foreign debt and for substantial restructuring of the remaining debt, including extension of the 
bulk of repayments beyond 2004 and until 2024.  With respect to private creditors, part of the 
remaining debt was converted into marketable Brady-type bonds.  The agreements allowed 
Poland to restore regular business relations with international financial community.  The 
country was given an investment grade from international rating agencies and returned – after 
fifteen years - to international financial markets.  Reduced investment risk combined with 
strengthened economic and political stability and rapid growth has made the Polish economy 
an increasingly attractive market for international investors.  At the same time, many 
restrictions on capital mobility were removed and foreign investors have been invited to 
participate in the privatisation programmes.  
The second reason for accelerated capital inflows were wide-ranging institutional and 
policy changes that took place in that period.  First, in 1992 Poland signed the Association 
Agreement (later renamed as Europe Agreement) with the EU.  The Agreement established 
within few years a free trade area for manufactures between Poland and the EU and opened 
way for joining the EU in future.  The largely unrestricted access to EU markets provided yet 
another strong motive for foreign investors to expand to Poland.  Second, the gradual 
implementation of the provisions of the Europe Agreement in the field of harmonisation of 
laws, as well as norms and standards, helped to substantially reduce transaction costs for 
foreign trade and investments.  In 1995, Poland assumed obligations of IMF Article VIII 
provisions for currency convertibility for current transactions, which considerably reduced the 
currency risk and increased transparency in foreign exchange transactions.  
                                                 
2  The share of FDI in total gross fixed capital formation in Poland exceeded 15% for the period 1996-1999.  In 
other emerging economies, the ratio varied from 3% in India and Russia to 9-12% in Argentina, Brazil, 
China and the Czech Republic, to 15-16% in Chile and Hungary and more than 20% in Venezuela and 
Kazakhstan (UNCTAD, 2000, pp.306-317).  
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Poland’s accession to OECD in 1996 also worked in the same direction.  One of the key 
policy reforms made at that time was the adoption of the new foreign exchange law that 
removed most of the remaining restrictions on capital account transactions.  The progress of 
market reforms, continued economic growth and rapid advances on the road towards full 
integration with the EU have all helped Poland in improving its image and reputation among 
investors.  This progress has been reflected in systematic upgrading of international 
investment rating for foreign currency denominated debt.  Starting with Standard & Poor’s 
grade of BB back in 1995, the country moved up by four notches in five years, reaching 
BBB+ in 2000.   Table 3 shows the evolution of the long-term foreign currency sovereign 
rating for Poland by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. 
Table 3  
Changes in the long-term foreign currency sovereign rating of Poland by two 
international agencies 
 
Year Standard & Poor’s Moody’ Investors Service 
1995 BB Baa3 
 Positive outlook  
1996 BBB-  
 Stable outlook  
1997 BBB  
 Positive outlook  
1988  Baa3 
 Positive outlook  
1999 BBB Baa1 
 Positive outlook Positive outlook 
2000 BBB+  
 Positive outlook  
2001 BBB+  
 Stable outlook  
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
An important component of market reforms and integration policies was gradual 
liberalisation of capital transactions.  It started already in 1989 with the elimination of 
restrictions on inward FDI and profit transfers abroad.  A further step was made in 1994 with 
the adoption of a new Foreign Exchange Act that opened way for removing many other 
restrictions on capital transactions and allowed Poland to assume obligations of Article VIII 
of IMF Articles of Agreement on current convertibility in June 1995.   In a series of 
Ordinances issued by the Ministry of Finance, all kinds of capital movements directly related 
to international trade transactions, such as commercial credits and all capital flows related to 
FDI, were made free.   
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This progress notwithstanding, cross-border capital mobility still remained more restricted 
than in OECD countries.  Upon accession to OECD in 1996, Poland was granted several 
derogations to the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and Code of Liberalisation of 
Invisible Transactions, but under the condition that these exceptions will be phased out by the 
end of 1999.  The exceptions included chiefly short term credits and loans, money market 
operations, opening deposit accounts by residents abroad and non-residents at home.  
However, due to a series of financial crises that hit the world economy in 1997-1998 (South-
East Asia, Russia), the pace of further liberalisation was slowed down.  A new Foreign 
Exchange Law that was prepared and promulgated in January 1999 still retains some 
restrictions on short-term capital flows.  The chronology of liberalisation of capital 
movements in Poland is presented in Annex A.  
The currently existing restrictions on capital movements refer principally to short-term 
capital flows and cover the following types of capital transactions (as of 30 September 2001). 
These transactions require permission from the NBP. 
1. Purchases by residents of foreign short-term securities with maturity less than one year 
and derivative instruments (except for authorised banks that are subject to specific 
precautionary norms); 
2. Issuing and sale by residents on foreign markets of short-term securities and derivatives 
with maturity less than one year; 
3. Purchases by non-residents of short-term securities and derivatives with maturity of less 
than one year on the domestic market, except for purchases of treasury bills and bonds 
and other securities offered by domestic banks; 
4. Issuing and sale by non-residents of short-term securities and derivatives with maturity of 
less than one year on the domestic market; 
5. Granting and receiving short-term credits and loans with maturity of less than one year 
between residents and non-residents, except for supplier credits and credits of less then 
EUR 50,000. 
6. Placements of deposits denominated in PLN by non-residents in domestic banks for less 
than 3 months and more than PLN 500,000. 
7. Opening accounts by residents abroad (except for travelling and temporary journeys) 
The key rationale behind maintaining the selective restrictions is to limit the scope for 
short-term capital movements and thus reduce the risk of a sudden withdrawal of capital in 
case of a speculative attack.  But the practical importance of these restrictions becomes 
limited as investors are able to use various derivative instruments to circumvent the existing 
restrictions3.   
                                                 
3  E.g. the restriction on short-term credits can be effectively neutralised by making swap transactions on future 
purchase (sale) of foreign (domestic) currency. 
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2.3. Macroeconomic Factors Behind Capital Inflows to Poland: Rapid Economic 
Growth and Restrictive Monetary Policy 
Foreign capital has been also attracted to Poland by robust economic growth and rapidly 
increasing domestic demand.  The “transformational” recession in Poland was milder and 
ended earlier than in other transition countries.  The economic recovery started already in 
1992, and the average annual GDP growth rate between 1993 and 2000 was 5.5%.  Rapidly 
growing incomes of population have made the Polish internal market of some 40 million 
consumers increasingly attractive for foreign investors and banks.  Increased access to foreign 
financing combined with accelerated expansion of consumer and investment expenditures.  
After 1995 domestic demand was growing much faster than GDP and as a result current 
account deteriorated substantially.  Figure 3 shows that the gap between the domestic demand 
and domestic output in 1996-1998 was in the range of 3-4 of GDP each year, and that it was 
eliminated only in the last quarter of 1999.  The gap was reflected in the growing current 
account deficit that exceeded 8% of GDP in the first half of 2000 before coming down to 
some 5.5% in the first half of 2001 (see Figure 4).   
Large current account deficit was partly a cause and partly an effect of large capital 
inflows.  On the one hand, higher imports were easily financed by credits from foreign banks 
– indebtedness of domestic companies increased from USD 16 bn in end-1997 to 26 bn in 
end-2000 – and by foreign purchases of Treasury bonds and bills that enabled the government 
to finance the budget deficit.  On the other hand, large FDI inflows were mirrored in the trade 
balance by massive imports of technologies and production components.  
Figure 3   
Changes in output and demand in Poland, 1996-2001, (in % per annum) 
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One factor that is frequently mentioned in the context of capital inflows analysis is the role 
of monetary policy.  Persistently high inflation inherited from last years of central planning 
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forced the central bank to systematically maintain high real interest rates in Poland.  This 
resulted in high yields on securities denominated in Polish currency, well above the yields on 
comparable securities in other countries, even after accounting for the expected depreciation 
of the złoty.  Simple economic logic would suggest that the large interest rate disparity should 
attract substantial amounts of capital to Poland, especially in the form of investments in fixed-
income instruments, such as Treasury bills, Treasury bonds, as well as bank credits extended 
to enterprises.   
Figure 4   
Current account balance in Poland, as % of GDP, 1994-2001 
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Figure 5 shows the interest disparity and portfolio capital inflows to Poland in 1995-2001. 
The interest disparity is measured here as the difference between the average rate of return on 
three-month Treasury Bills, reduced by the expected depreciation rate of the złoty 
(represented by the annualized pre-announced rate of crawl), and the three-month LIBOR rate 
(for USD).  The average interest disparity in 1995-1998 was about 3 percentage points and it 
never dropped below zero.  The disparity increased sharply to 12-13 percentage points in 
2000 and started to narrow only in mid-20014.  The portfolio inflows is the sum of fixed-
income investments and equity investments (up to 10% of total equity capital) 
                                                 
4 The crawling band for the exchange rate has been discontinued as of 12 April 2000 and the złoty has been 
under free float since then. 
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Figure 5    
Interest disparity and portfolio inflows to Poland, 1995-2001 
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It is difficult to discover any significant statistical relationship between the two variables.  
In fact, portfolio inflows seem to be uncorrelated with the observed changes in interest 
disparity.  Various estimations have demonstrated that some weak correlation could have 
been detected only for 1995-1997, but for the period 1998-2000 the correlation was actually 
negative.  
Yet there is no doubt that the high relative yields on Polish securities have attracted foreign 
investors; this is also confirmed by data on large purchases of Polish bonds by foreign 
investment funds.  But there certainly have been other factors that have blurred the picture.  
First, the level of investment risk tends to change frequently, especially in reaction to the 
changes in the balance of payments position of Poland and, more recently, also in the changes 
of the budget deficit.  The risk of a currency crisis associated with the rapidly growing current 
account deficit in 1996-1999 largely neutralised the attractiveness of higher yields on fixed-
income instruments.  In result, the growing interest disparity did not result in more inflows.  It 
should also be noted that the large purchases of bonds (or other securities) are frequently 
accompanied by parallel reductions in złoty-denominated account balances in commercial 
banks.  When aggregate statistical data are used in the analysis, the two effects may largely 
cancel out.  This effect could be detected in February-March 2000 and again in February-
March 2001, when massive purchases of 2-year and 5-year T bonds coincided with the 
reduction of outstanding balances on bank accounts and – more recently – by cutting the 
outstanding złoty positions in swap transactions.  
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3. IMPLICATIONS OF CAPITAL INFLOWS FOR MONETARY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
RATE POLICY 
3.1. The Upward Pressure on the Zloty, Sterilised Interventions and Excess 
Liquidity 
The rapid growth of capital inflows to Poland after 1994 strongly influenced nominal 
macroeconomic variables and affected the effectiveness of monetary and foreign exchange 
rate policies.  Under the rigid foreign exchange regime that was in operation between 1990 
and 1998, the central bank had no choice but to absorb the inflows, accumulate foreign 
reserves and, in order to avoid excessive increases of money supply, it had to substantially 
increase sterilization operations. 
Massive capital inflows that started suddenly in 1995 provided a first serious test for the 
ability of the central bank in the so-far very successful transition country to effectively 
respond to an unexpected surge of capital inflows.  The test was passed with enormous 
difficulties.  Capital inflows to Poland at that time were primarily attracted by very low 
exposure of foreign investors in the Polish market and by high rates of return on government 
securities.  In the last quarter of 1994 yields on 3-months Treasury Bills hovered around 27-
28% and the expected rate of annual devaluation was about 18% (1.4% per month 
compounded), yielding an expected return in foreign currency on złoty-denominated 
investment of about 10%, well above the 3-month LIBOR (6.2-6.3%).   The actual rate of 
return was even higher because the złoty tended to appreciate within the permitted band of 
fluctuations.  The share of Polish securities in the portfolios of foreign investment funds could 
have been largely expanded because of improvement of Poland’s creditworthiness, and 
foreign investors immediately responded to that new opportunity.   Faced with the rapid 
growth of reserve money in result of capital inflows and concerned with the potentially 
inflationary impact of monetary expansion, the central bank first reduced the rate of crawl in 
February 1995 to 1.2% per month, and two weeks later raised interest rates by 2-3 percentage 
points.  That was a serious policy mistake as both decisions have further increased the 
attractiveness of the złoty investments.  As a result, the (uncovered) interest disparity widened 
and capital inflows further intensified.  
In the first four months of 1995 inflows of foreign capital exceeded USD 2 bn; in addition, 
the strong export performance, including the so-called “non-registered transactions” further 
added to foreign exchange inflows5.  In results, the international reserves increased by half to 
USD 9 bn, while net foreign assets of the banking sector jumped from USD 11.2 bn to 14.5 
bn.  In April alone the GOR increased by USD 1.5 bn.  The NBP stepped up efforts to 
sterilise inflows, but it quickly became clear that if sterilisation operations would continue at 
that rate, the central bank would simply run into losses within few months.   
                                                 
5  The “non-registered transactions” include mostly net surplus of purchases and sales of foreign currency by 
private exchange counters resulting from unregistered exports by individuals and purchases by foreigners, 
and changes on foreign currency accounts of individuals in Polish banks.  Until 1995 this category was 
classified as “short-term capital movements”, and only after 1995 it has been included in current account 
transactions. 
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In April the pressure on the złoty got so intense, that the central bank had no choice but 
first to widen the fluctuation band for the zloty from +/-2% to +/-7 percent in May 1995 and 
then in June also to lower interest rates by 4 percentage points in an attempt to reduce the 
upward pressure on the currency. The relief, however, was only temporary: foreign investors, 
encouraged by good growth and reform prospects, continued to buy Polish securities, buying 
especially debt instruments. Moreover, since the central bank was reluctant to let the zloty 
move widely across the whole larger band and tried to limit the fluctuations to a much 
narrower inner band, investors immediately began to speculate on the appreciation of the 
zloty.  The central bank had to cut interest rates again in September, and in December it also 
decided to revalue the central parity of the band by 6% in December 1995.  The speculation 
on the appreciation thus paid off.  In the course of one year only gross official reserves of the 
central bank increased from USD 5.8 bn to almost 15 bn, chiefly in result of the interventions 
(see Table 1).  Thus, the defence of the peg was not only unsuccessful, but also quite costly, 
as the sterilization operations cost the central bank almost USD 1 bn, or 0.8% of GDP. 
Large capital inflows continued in 1996-1998, contributing to a steep increase of 
international reserves up to USD 27 bn in the end-1998.   In fact, the actual inflows were even 
higher than the figures in Table 1 would suggest, because in 1996-1998 the current account 
balance switched from surplus to growing deficit.  The capital inflows more than covered the 
growing current account deficit and supported the złoty rate consistently on the strong side of 
the central parity, frequently on the lower limit of the band.  The behaviour of the złoty rate 
with respect to central parity in 1995-2000 is shown on Figure 66. 
Figure 6   
Daily deviations of the fixing rate from central parity, May 1995 - December 2000, (%) 
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6  From October 1991 until end-1998 the złoty was fixed against the basket of currencies consisting of 45% of 
US dollar, 35% of Deutsche mark, 10% of British pound, 5% of French franc and 5% of Swiss franc.  After 
the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999 the basket was changed to 55% of euro and 45% of US dollar.  
The basket was discontinued when the złoty was floated in April 2000. 
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One important implication of the sterilised interventions under the controlled exchange rate 
was the accumulation of excess liquidity in the banking sector.  The National Bank of Poland 
absorbed extra liquidity through open market sales of short-term NBP bills. The net amount 
of NBP bills outstanding increased from PLN 14.7 bn at the end of 1996 to 31.1 bn in 
February 1998 – more or less the equivalent of total cash in circulation.  Despite the effort, 
broad money supply (M2) continued to increase at rates that were considered too high and 
inconsistent with the goal of reducing inflation to manageable levels.  In the course of three 
years between end-1994 and end-1997, the annual rate of growth of M2 declined only 
marginally from 37% to 33%.  Faced by constant difficulties in controlling the money supply, 
NBP had to resort to unconventional methods: it raised mandatory reserve requirements up to 
20% for a vista deposits and even offered attractive deposit facilities for individuals in an 
attempt to shore up the excess liquidity.  However, only when the exchange rate was 
eventually floated in 2000, the balance of reverse-repo operations declined to PLN 16-18 bn 
in the first half of 2001 and the liquidity problem got under control. 
The changes in the exchange rate policy in Poland after May 1995 are illustrated on Figure 
6 which shows the deviations of the exchange rate (złoty per basket of currencies) from 
central parity in percent (daily observations).  Even though the złoty could formally fluctuate 
within the +/-7% band since May 1995, the central bank maintained the rate strictly stable 
throughout 1995 at 5% and next at 6% from parity through daily interventions and fixing 
mechanism.  More variability was introduced after revaluation in December 1995: for about 
eighteen months the exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate within a narrow band of +/-2%.  
The spikes observed in July and November 1997 were caused, respectively, by the disastrous 
flood in the summer and uncertainties surrounding the economic programme of the new 
government after the parliamentary elections in September.   
3.2. The “Impossible Trinity” 
The key error was obviously that the central bank attempted to simultaneously control three 
different variables: the exchange rate, the interest rate and the level of reserve money (the 
latter variable being the operational instrument to control inflation).  This “eclectic” approach 
to monetary policy was possible for some time, when capital inflows were insignificant and 
the central bank was able to retain full control over monetary policy.  However, the “eclectic” 
approach turned out to be increasingly ineffective after 1994.  Under capital mobility, the 
three variables cannot be independently fixed by the central bank, and therefore at least one 
variable has to adjust.  This is the familiar “impossible trinity”.  If the level of the exchange 
rate is inconsistent with the level of interest rates to achieve a given inflation target, the 
resulting interest rate disparity will produce a tendency for capital inflows (or outflows).  In 
that case, either the exchange rate, or the interest rate, or the level of reserve money has to 
adjust.  And since the level of reserve money largely determines the level of inflation, the 
“impossible trinity” means that the central bank cannot simultaneously control the level of 
inflation and the level the exchange rate. 
The following simple model illustrates the “trilemma”.   If the central bank is responsible 
for maintaining price stability and capital is mobile internationally, the central bank can 
follow one of two principal monetary policy rules.  The first one is the “direct inflation 
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targeting rule” (DIT) under which the central bank fixes a target inflation level for a specific 
time horizon and adjusts monetary policy instruments in such a way as to reduce inflation to 
the target level.  In the process, the central bank prepares forecasts of inflation using all 
available information, including the observed past inflation.  If the forecast shows that future 
inflation is likely to be above the target, the central bank tightens monetary policy, e.g. raising 
interest rates.  If the forecast shows that inflation is likely to be below the target, the central 
bank can lower interest rates.  Let i denote the level of nominal interest rates, r - the level of 
real rate of return on capital, p - inflation, π – the inflation target, y – the actual level of 
output, and ymax – the full capacity level of output.  An asterisk (*) denotes foreign variables.  
Then the DIT rule can be formalised in form of a “reaction function” of the central bank: 
(1) i = i* + (r – r*) + (p – p*) + a(y – ymax) + b(p – π)   
or in a simplified notation: 
(1a) i = ∆ + b(p – π) 
Formula (1) shows that under the DIT rule the level of domestic nominal interest rates 
depends on the level of foreign interest rates, the difference between the rates of return on 
capital abroad and at home, the difference between inflation rates abroad and at home, the 
“gap” between the actual and potential output and the difference between the current inflation 
and the target inflation.  The last element is crucial as it determines the short-term reaction of 
the central bank to the difference between actual and target inflation.  The higher is the 
parameter b the stronger is the reaction of the central bank and the more restrictive is the 
stance of monetary policy. 
The second rule is the “exchange rate targeting rule” (ERT) under which the central bank 
chooses a certain target level of the exchange rate that is considered to be consistent with a 
desired level of inflation. Under this rule, the exchange rate either is fixed or it is adjusted in a 
pre-determined way, e.g. as a crawling peg or a crawling band.  This rule implies that the 
central bank has only limited control over domestic interest rates as their level is largely 
determined by the exchange rate target, ϕ(T).   
(2) i = Ω + f [ϕ(T)]   
where Ω is a constant.  Under a fixed peg or a fixed rate of crawl the central bank defends the 
target exchange rate through unlimited interventions on the foreign exchange market.  The 
monetary impact of interventions is typically sterilised to avoid unwanted changes in money 
supply.  The central bank has only limited choice in setting the level of interest rates: if the 
interest rates are too high they would attract more capital and require more sterilisation which 
can only be done at even higher interest rates.  When the interest rates are too low, the 
ensuing outflow of capital would drain international reserves of the central bank and may lead 
to a major currency crisis.   
In an open economy with capital mobility capital flows depend on the interest rate parity, 
i.e. the rate of return earned on domestic currency denominated assets adjusted by the 
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expected change of the exchange rate.  The interest rate parity (in an uncovered form7) can be 
written as follows: 
     ϕ - ϕ(e) 
(3)  i = i* + ________ + c        
         ϕ 
or in a simplified notation 
(3a)  i = i* + d(ϕ) + c  
where d(ϕ) is the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency and c is the measure 
of risk involved with holding domestic currency denominated assets.  If the parity holds, no 
capital flows take place - but this is not a frequent situation.  Normally equation (3) does not 
hold because of continued changes in the value of the risk factor because the changes in 
interest rates generally lag behind the changes in the risk factor.  When the resulting disparity 
is positive, foreign capital flows into the country, and when the disparity is negative there is a 
net capital outflow.  Note that the described relationship holds primarily for fixed-income 
investment, i.e. for capital flows that are sensitive to changes in interest rates.  The impact of 
disparity on movements of other capital categories, including equity investment, is generally 
much weaker and less direct. 
The selection of the inflation target π(T) determines the required level of interest rates, i(T), 
through equation (1), and the level of interest rates determines the expected change in the 
exchange rate, d(ϕ)’, through equation (3).  Alternatively, the selection of the target exchange 
rate, d(ϕ)’, determines the level of interest rates and then the level of expected inflation.  
Clearly, it is impossible to decide independently and simultaneously on the inflation level and 
on the exchange rate level.  Capital mobility links the two variables through the interest rate 
parity and the central bank can only control one variable, leaving the other one to be 
determined by the market. 
Equations (1)-(3) demonstrate that the level of interest rates – irrespective of the monetary 
rule adopted - is simultaneously determined by two entirely different sets of variables.  This is 
the gist of the “impossible trinity”.  The conflict between the variables can conveniently be 
presented in a graphical form in Figure 7. 
                                                 
7  The “uncovered parity” ignores the possibility of hedging against the exchange rate risk with a swap 
transaction. 
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Figure 7   
The „impossible trinity” 
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How has this “trilemma” been solved in Poland under the “eclectic” policy rule?  A 
plausible answer can be derived from the analysis of Figure 6 and from data on inflation.  It 
can be seen that the NBP was generally successful in keeping the złoty rate within the 
established band.  But Figure 6 also reveals that the actual band of permitted fluctuations was 
narrower than the official band and therefore the regime was in fact more rigid than officially 
presented.  After the band was officially widened to +/-7% in May 1995, the exchange rate 
was not allowed to move across the whole band.  Between May and September the “inner” 
limit on the stronger side of the parity was only 5%, and between September and December it 
was increased to 6%. After the revaluation of the central parity in December 1995, the 
exchange rate was never allowed to deviate by more than 4% from central parity.  Clearly, the 
market could always detect the actual “inner” band defended by the NBP and speculate 
accordingly.   
According to the logic of the “impossible trinity”, the strong commitment of NBP to 
defend the exchange rate level must have been incompatible with its commitment to reach the 
predetermined inflation targets.  Indeed, the record of disinflation in that period is rather poor.  
As demonstrated by figures in Table 4, never in the period 1990-1997 was the central bank 
able to fulfil its own inflation targets – the actual inflation was always higher.  This shows 
that, in practice, the NBP was able to achieve only one goal – and it deliberately chose the 
exchange rate level, not the inflation level. 
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Table 4  
Effectiveness of monetary policy under the “eclectic” approach: inflation targets and 
actual inflation in Poland, 1990-1997 (in %, December to December) 
Year Inflation target Actual inflation 
1990 95.0 245.0 
1991 32.0 60.4 
1992 36.8 44.3 
1993 32.2 37.6 
1994 23.0 29.5 
1995 17.0 21.6 
1996 17.0 18.5 
1997 13.0 13.2 
Source: NBP 
 
3.3. Capital Inflows and the Variability of the Exchange Rate  
in 1998-2001 
In February 1998, the band for fluctuations was substantially widened and the scope of 
interventions significantly reduced.  With the adoption of the direct inflation targeting 
framework in monetary policy since the beginning of 1999, the central bank announced also 
its intention to discontinue the crawling peg system altogether and to free float the national 
currency.  The decision to float the złoty was taken in April 2000 – the central parity against 
the basket of currencies and the band of permitted fluctuations around the parity have been 
eliminated.  But the złoty has been practically free already since July 1998, as the central 
bank has refrained from intervening in the foreign exchange market8. 
The behaviour of the exchange rate in Poland after the policy change in February 1998 is 
illustrated on Figure 6 which shows the deviations of the exchange rate (złoty per basket of 
currencies) from central parity in percent (daily observations)9.  The appreciation of the złoty 
in the first half of 1998 reflects the change of policy (the widening of the band to +/-12.5%) 
under large capital inflows while the depreciation in August 1998 shows the impact of the 
Russian crisis.  A shift from the stronger side to the weaker side of the parity in 1999 reflects 
                                                 
8  Between July 1998 and June 1999, the NBP did not buy or sell foreign exchange in regular forex 
transactions, but left open a possibility for banks to adjust their currency positions at the “fixing” rate after 
each trading day.  The system virtually eliminated the currency risk as the banks could always close their 
positions with the central bank at a rate that was pre-determined each day.  The “fixing” session for banks 
was discontinued in June 1999.  Since then the NBP did intervene only once and for a very small amount 
(less than USD 1 million ).  The option to intervene, however, remains open but is not used. 
9  As the central parity was eliminated on 12 April 2000, the deviations after that date have been calculated as 
deviations from the hypothetical central parity level depreciated every month by 0.3%. 
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deteriorating sentiments about the Polish market because of growing current account deficit, 
higher inflation and political conflicts in the ruling coalition10.  
The decision to float the złoty was consistent with the adopted direct inflation targeting rule 
of monetary policy.  It allowed for stabilizing the level of international reserves thus 
eliminating the most important source of excess liquidity in the domestic banking system and 
allowed the NBP to restore control over money supply.  All capital inflows and outflows have 
been going through the forex market and the changes in flows were fully reflected in the 
corresponding fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
Table 5 shows some measures of variability and volatility of the foreign exchange rate in 
Poland.  Variability is measured by the standard deviation of differences between the daily 
fixing and the central parity, while volatility is measured by the difference between the 
maximum and minimum deviation of the fixing from the central parity.  As can be seen, both 
measures have increased broadly in line with the width of the band and with the size of 
capital inflows. 
Table 5  
Deviations of the exchange rate from central parity, 1995-2001, in %. 
Year 
 
 
Mean 
deviation 
% 
Standard 
deviation 
Volatility 
a) 
  
Capital 
inflows 
USD mln 
1995 -5.33 0.881 3.967 4980 
1996 -2.22 0.413 2.267 4422 
1997 -0.96 1.888 9.508 7842 
1998 -5.59 2.418 9.713 12565 
1999 -1.90 2.552 13.760 8206 
2000 -3.34, b) 1.804 9.187 7905 
2001, c) -13.72, b) 2.892 9.918 3291 
a) e(max) – e(min) 
b) Assuming 0.3% devaluation per month  
c) January-June 
 
One interesting observation from table 5 is that the variability of the exchange rate initially 
diminished after the złoty was floated in April 2000.  Both measures of variability (standard 
deviation and the difference between maximum and minimum deviation) increased somewhat 
in the first half of 2001, but they were not much different from the values observed in 1999.  
At the same time capital inflows diminished as the increased exchange rate risk reduced 
incentives to invest in złoty denominated assets.  This episode provides a prima facie 
evidence that fears of floating may in most cases be exaggerated (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).  
                                                 
10  As a result, the deviations of the exchange rate from central parity have not followed a random walk, but 
they have displayed strong non-stationarity.  The results of the ADF test for stationarity of daily deviations 
are given in Annex C. 
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Another observation is that the average deviation from central parity also declined after the 
widening of the band in 1998.  Interventions by the National Bank of Poland on the foreign 
exchange market were discontinued after June 1999 and as a result capital inflows 
diminished.  This may be yet another confirmation of the hypothesis that the very existence of 
a rigid exchange regime with a relatively narrow band of fluctuations reduces the exchange 
rate risk and encourages foreign investors to buy more domestic securities, thereby increasing 
inflows and putting more pressure on the central bank.  
3.4. The Composition of Capital Inflows and the Role of Interest Rates 
As explained earlier, a large interest rate disparity induces capital inflows into fixed income 
instruments. These inflows need to be sterilised under a fixed exchange rate regime, or result 
in nominal appreciation of the national currency under a floating rate regime.  It is sometimes 
argued that the continued policy of high interest rates by the NBP after the change of the 
exchange rate regime in 1998 could therefore contribute to increased capital inflows and lead 
to appreciation. 
In addressing this issue it is important to distinguish between capital inflows that are 
sensitive to the changes in interest rate disparity and inflows that do not depend on these 
changes.  The first category of capital inflows includes investments in debt instruments such 
as fixed-income instruments (Treasury Bills, Treasury Bonds, corporate bonds, municipal 
bonds), credits extended by foreign banks to domestic companies and banks, and investment 
in other financial instruments such as time deposits and derivative transactions (swaps).  The 
second category encompasses investments in equity instruments, both portfolio investment 
and direct foreign investment in form of green-field investment and mergers and acquisitions, 
including privatisation transactions.  Of course, only the first category of capital inflows 
directly depends on the interest rate disparity. 
Figure 8   
Monthly net capital inflows to Poland, by category, 1997-2001 (mln USD) 
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Figure 8 shows the monthly amounts of net capital inflows in debt instruments and equity 
instruments between January 1997 and June 2001.  As can be seen, foreign investments in 
debt instruments have been generally lower and much more volatile than investments in 
equity instruments.  Table 6 provides summary figures.  The monthly average inflows in debt 
instruments in 1997-1999 were 2-3 times lower than inflows in equity instruments.  In 2000, 
the absolute amount of investments in debt instruments was actually negative.  By contrast, 
investments in equity instruments have been growing steadily, exceeding USD 9 bn in 2000.   
The same pattern seems to continue also in 2001. 
Table 6  
Capital inflows to Poland(1997-2001, US$ mn) 
Year Fixed income instruments Equity investment 
 mln USD Mean St.Dev. 
SD 
/mean mln USD Mean St.Dev 
SD 
/mean 
1997 1619 135 362 2,68 3696 308 137 0,44
1998 4851 404 442 1,09 7079 590 423 0,72
1999 1146 96 923 9,66 7060 588 435 0,74
2000 -2006 -193 924 -4,78 9911 826 1210 1,47
2001(I-VI) 553 92 626 6,80 3282 547 87 0,16
Source: National Bank of Poland  
 
Figure 9 shows the changes in the nominal exchange rate, measured in terms of złotys per 
50:50 basket of US dollar and euro, in 1998-2001.  The variablility of the nominal rate 
increased after the band was widened in February 1998, but the variations have not been 
excessively large.  Over three and a half years the exchange rate has never gone above 4.4 
PLN/basket and below 3.6 PLN/basket - a behaviour that would be exactly equivalent to a +/-
10% band around a (hypothetical) parity of 4 PLN/basket.  The fluctuations essentially 
followed political and macroeconomic developments in Poland and on international markets.   
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Figure 9   
PLN against the basket (50% USD + 50% EUR), daily quotations, Jan 1998 - Jun 2001 
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Table 7  
Episodes of appreciation: the impact of capital inflows 
Period 
 
 
Nominal  
appreciation 
%, a) 
Inflows in debt 
instruments 
mln $ 
Inflows in equity 
instruments 
mln $ 
IX/98 – X/98 4.7 549 687 
IV/99 – VI/99 3.9 274 1062 
XI/99 – III/00 6.7 118 4197 
V/00 – VIII/00 5.5 47 1461 
X/00 – VI/01 15.8 -2498 8605 
a) Złoty against the basket of USD and Euro (50%:50%) 
Source: National Bank of Poland, own calculations 
 
When examined jointly, Figures 7 and 8 clearly demonstrate that periods of nominal 
appreciation of the złoty did only remotely coincide with periods of increased inflows into 
debt instruments. In Table 7, the relevant data are collected for five episodes of nominal 
appreciation.  The picture is clear: nominal appreciation was caused by massive inflows into 
equity instruments, chiefly by FDI connected with large privatisation transactions (e.g. TPSA 
sale).  Inflows into debt instruments contributed only marginally, and - for the last and longest 
appreciation period – their impact on appreciation must actually have been negative.  High 
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domestic interest rates cannot therefore be responsible for the nominal appreciation of the 
złoty. 
4. AN “ECLECTIC” POLICY RULE UNDER CAPITAL MOBILITY: 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLISH CASE 
 4.1. The Analytical Framework 
Pursuing the policy of exchange rate–based stabilization in 1990-1998, the National Bank of 
Poland tried to keep the rate of the złoty within a relatively narrow band.  At the same time, 
NBP tried to reach the established monetary and inflation targets.  As already mentioned, 
under capital mobility such an “eclectic” policy may be internally inconsistent.  Two 
dilemmas immediately emerge.  First, sterilization of growing capital inflows requires higher 
domestic interest rates that attract even more foreign capital, rendering central bank’s efforts 
to reduce growth of money supply largely ineffective.  Second, slowing down the rate of 
crawl reduces the inflationary impact of devaluation but at the same time raises the expected 
rate of return on złoty-denominated assets.  This again attracts more capital and may work 
pro-inflationary.  The two dilemmas will be illustrated with the Polish data. 
The fundamental identity of the consolidated balance sheet of the banking system links 
broad money supply (M2) with three main sources of money creation – domestic credit (DC), 
credit to government (BC), and net foreign assets (NFA): 
(4) M2 = DC + BC + NFA + residual   
Taking changes and assuming residual = const., one obtains: 
(5) ∆M2 = a(∆DC) + b(∆BC) + c(∆NFA)  
With some simplification, changes in domestic credit (DC) can be expressed as a function 
of the level of domestic interest rates, i, and the level of income, Y: 
(6) ∆DC = f (i, Y) 
δf/δi < 0, δf/δY > 0  
Changes in net foreign assets (NFA) can be presented as a function of foreign capital 
inflows, including foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment and other capital 
inflows (PIOC), and the current account balance (CA): 
(7) ∆NFA = k(∆FDI) + m(∆PIOC) + nCA + ε  
FDI inflows can be assumed exogenous as they do not directly depend on monetary 
variables, but rather on the overall investment climate and growth prospects of the economy.  
By contrast, other inflows depend on the expected rate of return and the risk level. Defining 
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the expected rate of return as (uncovered) interest disparity and approximating the risk level 
with the level of gross official reserves (GOR), PIOC can be expressed as follows: 
(8) ∆PIOC = g [(i – i* - d(ϕ)), GOR], 
δg/δ(i – i*- d(ϕ)) > 0, δg/δ(GOR) > 0  
Where i* is foreign interest rate and d(ϕ) is the expected annual rate of devaluation of the 
zloty. To close the model, it is necessary to link inflation (CPI) with money supply and 
expected devaluation: 
(9) CPI = p [M2, d(ϕ)], 
 δCPI/δM2 > 0, δCPI/δ d(ϕ) > 0  
At this stage it is assumed that no sterilisation takes place. This assumption is relaxed in 
section 4.3. 
4.2. Estimation Results 
Equations (5) – (9) have been estimated from 39 monthly observations covering the period 
January 1995 – March 199811.  Equation (5) has been estimated in two specifications: in the 
first variant (equation 10) net foreign assets are expressed in złoties (PLN) and in the second 
variant (equation 11) NFA is in dollars (USD) and the exchange rate (FER) is added as an 
additional variable.   
As all variables representing monetary aggregates (M2, NFA, DC, BC) are expressed in 
terms of cumulative amounts, this involves non-stationarity of those variables.  Testing for 
stationarity with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test – ADF – has shown that in both 
specifications of  equation (5) all variables (except NFAUSD) are non-stationary at 5% level.  
To check whether the OLS estimation procedure is allowed under these circumstances, the 
Johansen test for cointegration was performed for both equations.  The test gave a negative 
result for the first equation and a positive result for the second equation.  First equation has 
therefore been transformed into first-differences (for which the ADF test showed 
stationarity), while the second equation has been left unchanged. The results of estimation are 
as follows (t-statistics in brackets): 
(10) ∆M2  = 832.5 + 0.485 ∆DC + 0.87 ∆BC + 0.498 ∆NFAPLN 
  (1.72)    (2.45) (7.38)  (4.63) 
R^2 = 0.636   F(stat) = 19.80 
Adj. R^2 = 0.604  DW = 2.61 
 
 
                                                 
11  In February 1998 the central bank changed its foreign exchange policy allowing for much wider fluctuations 
of the exchange rate and reducing the size of intervention.   
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(11) M2 = -27030 + 0.895 DC + 0.571 BC + 1.797 NFAUSD + 8197 FER 
 (-4.75)   (15.82)       (5.10)      (17.45)    (2.95) 
R^2 = 0.999   F(stat) = 8404.5 
Adj. R^2 = 0.999  DW = 1.24 
 
In estimating the remaining equations the following assumptions have been made with 
respect to the relevant variables:  
• the domestic interest rate is represented by the rate of return on three-month Treasury Bills 
(on primary auctions); 
• the foreign interest rate is represented by the three-month LIBOR on US dollars; 
• expected devaluation is measured by the current monthly rate of crawl compounded for 12 
months; 
• monthly income levels are measured by monthly changes in the index of industrial 
production (IND), as monthly GDP figures are not available; 
It was also assumed that both the domestic credit (DC) and capital inflows (PIOC) react to 
the changes in the interest rate with a three month lag, while CPI reacts to the changes in M2 
with a six month lag12.  Equation (6), first estimated in a simple general form: 
 r(DC) = a + b IND + c i(-3) 
showed very high autocorrelation (DW = 0.31).  Through an autoregressive correction the 
equation has been transformed into the following one13: 
(12) r(DC) = 55.99 – 0.03 IND* - 0.784 i(-3)* + 0.925 r(DC, -1) 
  (5.17)   (-0.56) (-1.67)  (13.97) 
R^2 = 0.918   F(stat) = 115.1 
Adj. R^2 = 0.910  DW = 1.29 
 
The results for the three remaining equations are as follows (∆s omitted for simplicity): 
                                                 
12  These time lags have been selected because they displayed best statistical properties. 
13  Autoregressive correction allows for eliminating most of autocorrelation of the error term from the original 
equation and thereby increases efficiency of structural parameters.  The original regression equation: 
 Y(t) = a + b X(t) + u(t) 
 with an autocorrelation process of a general form: 
 u(t) = ρ u(t-1) + ε(t), and:   ρ ≠ 0 
 is transformed into an autoregressive equation: 
 Y(t) = ρ Y(t-1) + b X*(t) + ε(t), 
 where: X*(t) = X(t) - ρ X(t-1).  Note that the autoregressive correction does not change the interpretation of 
structural parameters. 
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(13) NFA = -186.1 + 1.78 FDI + 0.694 PIOC + 1.24 CA 
 (-1.99)    (4.91)        (7.70)         (10.44) 
R^2 = 0.790   F(stat) = 43.9 
Adj. R^2 = 0.772  DW = 1.77 
 
(14) PIOC = -5638 + 855.4 DISP + 0.614 GOR(-3)  
 (-6.81)   (6.32)   (12.82) 
R^2 = 0.876   F(stat) = 117.0 
Adj. R^2 = 0.869  DW =  0.64 
 
(15) CPI = -23.67 + 0.552 rM2(-6) + 1.784 d(ϕ)  
  (-6.57)   (6.33)     (6.02) 
 R^2 = 0.833   F(stat) = 74.6 
 Adj. R^2 = 0.821  DW = 0.62 
 
where DISP = i – i* - d(ϕ) and rM2 is the rate of growth of broad money.  Equation (14) has 
two important shortcomings: non-stationarity of PIOC and GOR, and high autocorrelation of 
the error term.  Non-stationarity does not have to disqualify an equation provided the 
variables are co-integrated.  The Johansen cointegration test confirms the existence of at least 
one co-integrating equation, which allows to use (14) in its present form.  As far as 
autocorrelation is concerned, autoregressive correction could not be performed neither for 
(14) nor for (15) as it yielded non-convergence of parameters.  Therefore, equations (14) and 
(15) have to be interpreted with great caution.  
The results obtained allow for assessing – in a comparative statics framework - the impact 
of changes in the control variables, i.e. domestic interest rate and the rate of crawling 
devaluation, on money supply and inflation.  Table 8 provides a summary of this exercise.  As 
can be seen, under the assumption of a fixed exchange rate (or a fixed crawling rate) and in 
the absence of sterilization, capital inflows may lead to a “perverse” effect of interest rates 
changes: an increase of the interest rate by one percentage point may actually lead to an 
increase, rather than a decrease, of the inflation rate by 0.22-0.23 percentage point. By 
contrast, a reduction of the rate of crawl by one percentage point unambiguously reduces 
inflation by 1.32-1.42 percentage point.  Obviously, it should be remembered that this is a 
short term and comparative static result. 
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Table 8  
Poland: Impact of changes interest rates and expected devaluation on money supply and 
inflation under capital mobility 
Control 
variables 
Endogenous variables 
∆i ∆ d(ϕ) ∆(PIOC) ∆NFA ∆DC ∆M2 rM2 
Equation(s) 
(percent. pts.)
  
($ mln) (PLN mln) 
Impact on 
inflation 
∆CPI 
(percent. pts.) 
Changes in the interest rate 
7,10,11,12 +1   -     855 594    -    844   0.66     0.36 
8,10,11,12 +1 -     855 594 - 1067 0,83 0,46 
7,9,12 +1 - - - -615 -298 -0.23 -0.13
8,9,12 +1 - - - -615 -550 -0.43 -0.24
Neteffect +1    0.22+0.23 
Changes in the rate of crawl 
15,13,10,16 - -1 835 594 - 844 0.66 0.36 
15,13,11,16 - -1 835 594 - 844 0.83 0.46 
16 - -1 - - - - - -1.78
Neteffect - -1   -(1.32+1.42) 
Source: Own calculations 
 
4.3. The Impact of Sterilization 
Of course, central banks do not sit idle in the face of large capital inflows.  They typically 
resort to sterilization operations, trying to reduce the monetary impact of capital inflows.  But 
the efficiency of those operations may be very limited.  Consider a simple model of capital 
flows introduced first by Kouri  and Porter (1974). 
(16) CI = α ∆NDA + b ∆i* + c CA + d ∆Y + ε  
Where NDA – net domestic assets of the central bank, and α is the offset coefficient which 
measures the reaction of capital inflows to the changes in the level of sterilization operations.  
A fall in NDA means that the central bank sells securities to the banking sector, thereby 
reducing the supply of reserve money.  As sterilization induces capital inflows, α should have 
a negative sign.  A high (absolute) value of α means that sterilization is largely ineffective.   
Model (16) assumes that the exchange rate is constant.  In order to apply the model to the 
conditions of an economy with an adjustable peg regime, CI needs to be decomposed into two 
variables – one measuring the changes in the exchange rate (CIFEX) and another measuring 
the “pure” changes in capital inflows (CIN) under a fixed exchange rate (of course, CI = 
CIFEX + CIN).  Defining CI as a cumulative increase in gross official reserves, Y as an index 
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of industrial output (average monthly in 1994 = 100), and i* as the three month LIBOR, 
equation (16) has been estimated for the period from January 1995 to March 1998.  The 
results, after allowing for autoregressive correction (variables after correction are marked 
with an apostroph ‘), are shown in (17): 
(17) CIN = 8416 – 0.561 NDA’ - 0.215 CIFEX’ - 540.5 i* + 1.131 CA’ + 46.95 Y’ + + 0.896 AR(1)
            (1.15)   (-6.08)    (-1.03)   (-0.49      (2.72) (2.40)      (23.18) 
      
R^2 = 0.995   F(stat) = 983.9 
Adj. R^2 = 0.994  DW = 2.05 
 
The offset coefficient (α = -0.561) suggests that an increase in the level of sterilization 
operations by, say, PLN 1 billion entails a “secondary” inflow of capital of about PLN 0.56 
billion.  Adding to that the effects of systematic devaluation, the monetary implications 
expressed in terms of złotys are even larger.  Since the sum of coefficients in NDA and 
CIFEX is about 0.78, this suggests that sterilization operations were in fact neutralized in 75-
80% by additional capital inflows.  
The magnitude of sterilization operations depends on a variety of policy factors that 
typically can be jointly represented in the form of a certain reaction function of the central 
bank (18): 
(18) NDA = -β CI + ε  
where β is the reaction coefficient (∆s are omitted).  If β = 0, the central bank refrains from 
sterilization; if β = 1, each unit of incoming capital is fully sterilized with a corresponding 
decrease in net domestic assets of the central bank.  Decomposing CI into CIFEX and CIN, 
estimating for the same time period as for the previous model, and allowing for 
autoregressive correction, one obtains: 
(19) NDA = 4267 – 0.855 CIN’ - 0.968 CIFEX’ + 0.324 AR(1)  
  (5.39) (-21.68) (-15.86)    (1.99) 
 R^2 = 0.996   F(stat) = 2853 
Adj. R^2 = 0.995  DW = 2.01 
 
The reaction coefficient (β = - 0.855) shows that out of each PLN billion of capital inflows 
the central bank sterilized on average PLN 855 million.  Substituting (18) into (17), one 
obtains a measure of full impact of sterilization on capital inflows (see, e.g. Bond, 1998). 
(20) CIN = [1/(1-αβ)] (a G) 
or 
(21) CIN = 1.922 (a G)  
Where G stands for the sum of other variables (CIFEX, i* and Y).  Equation (21) shows 
that the sterilisation by the Polish central bank of autonomous capital inflows induced by a 
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change in the components of G increased these inflows through a cumulative process broadly 
by a factor of 1.9. 
5. NEW CHALLENGES AND SUGGESTED POLICY RESPONSES 
5.1. The Choice of an Exchange Rate Regime in the Transition Period to EMU 
Poland, along with many other countries of central and east Europe, wants to gain 
membership in the European Union within next 3-4 years and also intends to join the 
Economic and Monetary Union as soon as practically possible.  According to the provisions 
of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and in line with the decision of the EU summit in 
Copenhagen in 1993, the candidate countries will have obligatory join the EMU after their 
accession to the EU. The economic and political conditions for accession as formulated at the 
Copenhagen summit included, among others, the requirement for the candidate countries to 
be able to assume a wide range of obligations arising from full membership, including 
membership in the monetary union.  No “opt-out” clause was offered to new members – by 
contrast to some incumbent members (Denmark).   
The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty imply that new members can join the EMU only 
after they have met a set of criteria for nominal convergence – the so-called Maastricht 
criteria.  Moreover, the membership can be gained not earlier than two years after a new 
member has joined the EU14.   Prior to EU accession candidate countries are free to adopt the 
exchange rate regime of their choice.  However, in the transition period between gaining EU 
membership and joining the EMU, the new members are expected to enter ERM-II.  The 
Treaty thus attempts to establish an explicit link between the speed of the accession process 
for EU membership and the speed of approaching the EMU, and to define a specific financial 
convergence path for the candidate countries.   
The ERM-II does not require any specific exchange rate regime prior to joining the EU.  
Any regime can be seen compatible in the transition period to ERM-II.  Poland has therefore 
basically three options for the transition period: to maintain the float, to switch to a fixed rate 
regime, or to re-introduce a sort of an intermediate solution – e.g. a fixed or crawling band.  It 
will be argued that the two latter options are not recommended for the Polish economy. 
Pegging the national currency to a currency of the main trading partner seems to be a 
reasonable solution because it offers stability, but it involves a number of risks that may even 
be fatal.  First, if a transition country trades with and borrows from different partners with 
different currencies, changes in nominal cross-rates may provoke wide changes in real values, 
undermining the financial position of exporters.  More importantly, massive swings of 
international capital put enormous pressures on the fixed exchange rate and may overwhelm 
                                                 
14 „The criterion of participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System ... shall 
mean that a Member State has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism of the EMS without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the examination...” 
(Protocol on the Convergence Criteria as Mentioned in Article 109F of the Maastricht Treaty, Article 3, 
emphasis added). 
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the currency.  A pegged rate regime requires a higher level of international reserves; but this 
is costly and - by itself - does not provide a guarantee of stability.   
The series of recent financial crises provides a clear and valuable lesson on the inherent 
risks involved with fixed exchange rate regimes.  Virtually all crises - from Mexico and the 
Czech Republic to East Asia, Russia and, more recently Turkey - took place in countries with 
pegged foreign exchange rates.  True, there were different underlying reasons behind the 
crises, including weak fundamentals and macroeconomic mismanagement in the first place, 
but the fixed exchange rate deprived the countries concerned necessary flexibility to make 
appropriate adjustments when hit by external or internal shocks.  Even a currency board does 
not seem to be a “waterproof” solution, as demonstrated by turbulences in Argentina, where 
the currency board did not prevent the national currency from coming under intensive 
speculative pressure and the authorities contemplated even abandoning the peso altogether 
and the switch to the US dollar.  After all, the currency board - though legally more binding 
than a regular fixed rate - is still a unilateral peg that can be revoked by a unilateral decision. 
The key problem in ensuring the stability of the pegged regime is that of credibility.  Full 
credibility practically removes any risk of speculation.  But credibility is an elusive goal and 
one that is not given forever.  In the first place, credibility of commitment to maintain the 
fixed rate depends on the form of the peg.  A currency board is generally considered as a 
more credible system than a conventional peg, because it is legally more binding and its 
change typically requires lengthy parliamentary procedures.  This is why some authors have 
suggested a currency board as an optimal arrangement for the candidate countries, as a 
prelude to unilateral euroisation (Mundell, 2000).  Second, credibility of commitment 
depends on the overall policy stance.  Generally, if the macroeconomic policies are 
considered by market players as imprudent and unsustainable in the longer run, the market 
will increasingly expect depreciation of the national currency.  This in turn will trigger 
speculative behavior by investors and, unless the policies are credibly corrected, the exchange 
rate regime will collapse.  This mechanism has been described by Krugman (1979). 
But even if the macroeconomic policies are correct, the market may still consider that 
government’s commitment to defend the exchange rate as not credible enough.  If the 
government is politically weak, or its policies are likely to lead to increased unemployment 
and may provoke massive social protests, the ability of the government to defend the 
exchange rate will necessarily be reduced.  In that case, market players expect a policy shift 
leading to an eventual devaluation, and will behave accordingly, increasing a downward 
pressure on the pegged currency (Ozkan, Sutherland, 1994; Drazen, Masson, 1994; Obstfeld, 
1994).  This case is relevant for transition countries where currencies have been weak and 
political stability relatively low.  The very prospect of devaluation gives an obvious incentive 
for market players to anticipate events and to attack the currency.  One important implication 
of this model is that speculative attacks can be self-fulfilling.  Another is that a financial crisis 
may strike even the countries with sound economic policies, either through a „contagion 
effect” (e.g. if a devaluation in one country threatens the competitiveness of its neighbors), or 
through a sudden shift in market sentiments.  Von Hagen (2000) argues that the usefulness of 
a currency board may critically depend on economic developments in neighbouring countries, 
as demonstrated by the experience of Argentina.  Thus, virtuous behaviour is not a guarantee 
against crises.  
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Many observers argue that an appropriate remedy to all these deficiencies is a move toward 
an arrangement in which the national currency is allowed to fluctuate more or less freely 
(Eichengreen, 1999; Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).  A floating exchange rate regime allows for a 
flexible adjustment to changing environment, including a change in the fundamentals and in 
relevant policies.  Currency flexibility may work as a buffer against real shocks. 
These are obvious advantages.  After the East Asian crisis many emerging economies 
abandoned their pegs and moved to floating rate regimes, though almost always with active 
interventions.  There are at least three reasons for a float to be less susceptible to crises than a 
fixed rate regime.  First, under a float the exchange rate can adjust more quickly and 
smoothly to real shocks.  This is because of nominal rigidity of domestic prices and wages.  
Under a fixed regime and with nominal rigidities, the adjustment to an adverse shock can 
only take form of a fall in output and employment.  This is much more costly.  Second, under 
a float domestic banks and firms have more incentives to hedge against the currency risk of 
the foreign borrowing and/or liabilities.  In the south-east Asian crisis, the build-up of foreign 
debt owed a great deal to the expectation that the fixed peg would be maintained.  Third, a 
float makes speculation more difficult because any speculator taking a long currency position 
has to find some other private sector agent to take the other side of the deal (Brash, 1999).   
But the float does also involve some problems that cannot be dealt away easily.  Under a 
flexible rate regime the burden of adjustment to external or policy-induced shocks rests 
almost entirely on the exchange rate level.  The most important deficiency of such an 
arrangement is that the necessary adjustment may be very large, leading to very wide swings 
in the nominal exchange rate level.  Under downward sticky prices this may lead to wide 
changes in real wages and profits, as well as to higher inflation (in case of downward 
adjustments).  This potential for wide fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate is basically 
the result of high capital mobility and increases with the level of capital flows.   
It should be noted that the share of foreign exchange transactions related to flows of goods 
and services in total transactions involving foreign exchange in more advanced transition 
countries has been diminishing in line with the growth of the size of the foreign exchange 
market.  In Poland, the average amount of all transactions on the foreign exchange market is 
now between $ 1.5 and 2 bn per day, but transactions related to payments for exports and 
imports of goods and services account only for $ 120-170 mln, i.e. less than 10% of total 
flows.  Moreover, an increasing proportion of capital transactions are conducted abroad, 
mainly in London, in form of currency swaps, futures and options, such as, e.g., Non-
Deliverable-Forward transactions (NDFs).  Only a small part of those transactions are linked 
to foreign direct investment - most reflect financial investments and hedging transactions.  In 
sum, the developments on the foreign exchange market are to a large and still growing extent 
determined by financial capital flows. 
Capital mobility under a flexible rate regime implies a large potential for massive swings in 
the exchange rate level.  The result is higher uncertainty, more instability, lower investment 
and less trade.  These effects will generally be more pronounced in small open economies, 
because in such economies the exchange rate determines prices of a higher proportion of 
goods and services produced.   
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There is, of course, an effective way to reduce the negative impact of the increased 
volatility of the exchange rate through universal including currency risk clauses in 
commercial contracts and providing simple currency risk insurance schemes.  They would 
marginally increase transaction costs but the price is worth paying given the scope of 
potential disruptions produced by wild swings in exchange rates. 
As with any choice, also the choice of an exchange regime should be weighted against its 
potential negative implications.  A fixed exchange rate regime may be a preferred solution for 
a small open economy with a large share of trade in GDP and with a large share of one single 
foreign currency in total trade.  If a fixed rate regime is chosen it should be as credible as 
possible to reduce incentives for speculation.  This calls for a currency board, preferably 
using the euro as the currency of the peg.  “Tying hands” of the monetary authority can, 
however, be painful in times of asymmetric shocks or when investors loose confidence in 
domestic polices.  
A float may in turn be a preferred solution for less open and less internationally integrated 
economies that may be more susceptible to asymmetric shocks.  Under such conditions, an 
independent monetary policy may help in cushioning the adverse impact of external and 
domestic shocks.  An independent float is generally considered to be superior to a managed 
float because the absence of any explicit or implicit exchange rate target largely eliminates 
motives for speculation.  But in the context of accession countries the independent float may 
in fact not be the best solution.  These economies have still underdeveloped financial markets 
and occasionally experience large capital inflows under big privatisation transactions.  Such 
transactions tend to destabilise the foreign exchange market as they produce wide swings in 
the nominal exchange rate that are not linked to changes in the macroeconomic fundamentals 
but rather reflect discrete decisions by the government and foreign corporations. In the 
standard Mundell-Flemming model, regular capital inflows attracted by interest rate disparity 
adjusted by a risk premium lead to real appreciation.  Subsequent large and growing current 
account deficit would typically increase macroeconomic risk and at some point reverse capital 
flows.  This in turn would produce currency depreciation necessary to restore current account 
balance.  
This self-correcting mechanism gets blocked in a country that receives large capital inflows 
under privatisation transactions.  The resulting appreciation tends to be excessive in the sense 
that when privatisation stops the downward adjustment of the exchange rate may be very 
large and sudden.  This “boom-bust” exchange rate behavior can be called as the “Ikarus 
syndrome” (Rosati, 2000b).  Under such circumstances it may therefore be reasonable to 
resort to occasional interventions that would absorb some of the privatisation inflows but 
without targeting any specific exchange rate level (a variant of a “dirty float” regime).  
5.2. Is ERM-II Necessary as a Transitory Stage to Full EMU Membership? 
ERM-II is a general exchange rate arrangement consisting of a fixed central parity against the 
euro, a pre-determined band of fluctuations up to +/- 15% around the parity, and the policy 
rule of automatic and unlimited intervention at the limits of the band, supported if necessary 
by short-term financing from the ECB.  The ECB acting together with the national central 
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bank of an accession country can, however, suspend intervention if it would lead to higher 
inflation.  Narrower bands can be declared unilaterally by a candidate country (ECOFIN, 
2000).  
ERM-II is considered as a test of stability for the currency of a candidate country.  
However, for countries that have been using a currency board for long time and have built up 
high credibility, a switch to ERM-II with its band of permitted fluctuations would actually 
introduce more instability and would mean a step backward.   For countries that would decide 
to replace their national currency by the euro (unilateral “euroisation”), ERM-II would have 
even less sense, as it would involve a restoration of the national currency, only to again 
eliminate it several years later.  Those countries should be allowed to move directly to the 
EMU, provided they fulfil all other requirements. 
Poland has applied an independent float and joining ERM-II would certainly increase the 
risk of speculation.  First, the central parity may not be selected properly as to reflect a  
medium-term equilibrium level.  Second, putting a straight-jacket of a narrow band of 
fluctuations would encourage investors to test the resistance of the limits of the band, 
especially under conditions of massive capital inflows attracted by higher returns and 
prospects of EU membership.  A standing commitment by the ECB to help the national 
central bank to defend the band may not be terribly effective in keeping away speculators, as 
the ECB may have different interpretation of the underlying causes of a speculative attack.  If 
the turbulences are seen as caused by domestic policy imprudence rather than external shocks, 
the ECB would surely refrain from intervening.   
In sum, ERM-II may be of limited use for Poland.  A system that has been designed in 
early 1990s may not be suitable now, under conditions of greatly expanded capital mobility 
and for countries with much more integrated economies and financial systems.  Given these 
new circumstances the EU could be well advised to apply more flexibility in interpreting the 
exchange rate obligations of the new members in light of the general provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty, rather than insist on literal and rigid adherence to particular requirements. 
5.3. Free Capital Mobility: A Blessing or a Curse? 
Given all the problems in managing capital inflows it would be quite natural to reconsider the 
arguments in favour of full liberalisation of capital movements.  It may be argued that a more 
practical and safer solution would be for some emerging economies to simply reduce the 
scope of capital mobility for certain categories of capital inflows.  Economic theory and 
empirical evidence suggest that what is most important for ensuring rapid growth is currency 
convertibility on current transactions and opening up to FDI inflows.  Free access to foreign 
credits is also helpful, provided banking sector regulation is efficient enough to monitor the 
process of external borrowing by domestic companies and banks.  But early liberalization of 
other capital transactions, and especially of short-term financial flows may actually produce 
more harm than good.   
Three options can be considered in this context.  First, to suspend further liberalization of 
capital transactions in countries that have not yet opened up their capital accounts - or to 
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reintroduce some restrictions in more liberalized countries - until their financial sectors 
become more developed and their structural characteristics more substantially similar to those 
in industrialized countries (the EU).  Second, to introduce temporary tax-based capital 
controls in form of mandatory reserves with the national bank on all short term capital 
movements.  Both options involve some costs but they probably can help in preventing 
financial crises, provided other domestic policies are correct.  The case of Chile is particularly 
telling.  Mandatory reserves worked relatively well in the initial period, but with the passage 
of time their efficiency declined as investors were able to find ways to circumvent the formal 
controls and used more sophisticated financial instruments, including swaps and forward 
transactions.  The unwanted side effects involved also efficiency losses resulting from the 
segmentation of the capital market and costs of administrative controls.  The third option is to 
unilaterally replace the domestic currency by the euro (“euroisation”). 
The first option is probably not open anymore for Poland.  It would be politically very 
difficult to backtrack on capital liberalisation just few years before EU accession, especially if 
not all the necessary reforms of the financial system have been yet introduced.  The second 
option can be used, as the Foreign Exchange Law from 1999 contains provisions allowing the 
National Bank of Poland to introduce mandatory reserves on short term capital inflows as 
emergency measures to protect balance of payments.  The third option is discussed below.  
5.4. Unilateral “Euroisation”? 
The idea of the unilateral introduction of the euro in accession countries has been supported 
by several authors (Bratkowski and Rostowski,1999; Mundell, 2000; Nuti, 2000).  The 
authors have argued that accession countries, confronted with increasing capital inflows 
attracted by growing investment opportunities and prospects of EU membership, will be 
unable to simultaneously control inflation and avoid excessive appreciation.  The level of real 
interest rates in those countries is likely to be higher than in the EU countries because of 
persistently higher inflation in the non-tradeable sector (the Balassa-Samuelson effect) and 
more attractive investment opportunities (relative scarcity of capital ensures higher returns on 
investment in those countries).  If they adopt a fixed rate regime, capital inflows would 
require massive sterilised interventions that may go out of control.  If they adopt a floating 
rate regime their tradeable sector would suffer from excessive appreciation which can 
seriously damage the competitiveness of these economies and eventually also lead to a 
currency crisis.   
The solution to this dilemma is to unilaterally replace the national currency by the euro.  
This would result in lower inflation, lower interest rates, stable terms-of-trade and lower 
transaction costs.  The “euroisation” would reduce uncertainty as it would eliminate the 
currency risk and risks of exchange rate fluctuations resulting from capital flows.  The 
possibility of a speculation attack and a currency crisis would all but disappear on the account 
of the national currency being eliminated. 
This proposal was met initially with a lot of criticism.  It was argued that neither inflation 
would be much lower because of the presence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect, nor interest 
rates would fall that much because of still higher commercial and sovereign risk prevailing in 
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the accession countries.  After all, a unilateral decision on the introduction of the euro would 
never be as credible as the multilateral decision, i.e. based on a formal membership in the 
EMU.  A unilateral decision can always be unilaterally revoked.  Also, gains from 
discontinued sterilisation could be more than offset by a loss of seigniorage revenue.  The 
most fundamental critique, however, referred to high susceptibility of accession countries to 
asymmetric shocks that would significantly increase the cost of giving up monetary 
independence by those countries.  In sum, the benefits would not be as large, and costs as low 
as Bratkowski and Rostowski suggested (Rosati, 1999).   
The idea of unilateral “euroisation” has also met with strong opposition from the EU.  The 
representatives of the EU Commission, ECOFIN, the ECB and some member countries (most 
notably Germany) argued that the introduction of the single currency should only be the final 
stage of a long and gradual adjustment process that will ensure nominal and real convergence 
between the accession countries and the EU member countries.  Before the accession 
countries can join the euro area they are supposed to complete reforms of their financial and 
real sectors and raise income and wealth levels closer to the EU averages.  No “short-cuts” 
must be accepted.  Otherwise the financial and price stability of the EMU may be undermined 
(European Commission, 2000). 
This critique to a large extent misses the point as it refers to membership in the EMU rather 
than to the unilateral introduction of the euro.  These are two entirely different things.  The 
unilateral decision by an accession country has nothing to do with membership in the EMU, 
neither gives it any decision rights in the ECB.  The decision, if taken, is solely on the 
responsibility and risk of the accession country.  Unilateral euroisation does not affect the 
requirement to obligatory meet the nominal convergence criteria and as such cannot impair 
financial discipline in the euro area.  To the contrary, it can actually strengthen the single 
currency as it would increase transaction demand for the euro. 
With the passage of time also other risks connected with unilateral euroisation seem to be 
gradually diminishing.  The scope for asymmetric shock in the most advanced accession 
countries is now limited, because of progress in integration through trade and investment 
(Buiter, Grafe, 2001; Rosati, 2001).  As Poland advances with membership negotiations, the 
perspective for gaining EU membership in 2004 or 2005 becomes more realistic, reducing 
further commercial and sovereign risks and bringing down long-term interest rates.  Under 
these circumstances the replacement of the national currency by the euro may indeed become 
a sensible solution.  However, it is important to realise that even the euroisation will not 
eliminate the Balassa-Samuelson effect: under a single currency this effect will inevitably 
manifest itself through generally higher inflation in the accession countries than in the EMU 
countries. 
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ANNEX A 
Chronology of Changes in the Regulatory Measures on Capital Mobility in Poland 
 CATEGORIES OF CAPITAL 
MOVEMENTS 
According to the OECD Code of Liberalization 
of Capital Movements 
 
DATE OF LIBERALISATION 
 
I. DIRECT INVESTMENT (according to the 
OECD/IMF benchmark definition, e.g. equity, 
credits and loans between the related companies, 
reinvested earnings) 
 
A. By non-residents in Poland 
 
B. By residents abroad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
01.02.1996  
 
22.03.1996 in the OECD countries and the countries, 
with which Poland concluded the investment protection 
treaties. In other countries the authorization by the NBP 
is necessary. 
 
II. LIQUIDATION OF DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
     A. Abroad by residents 
     B. In Poland by non-residents 
 
 
 
01.02.1996 
01.02.1996 
 
III. OPERATIONS IN REAL ESTATE 
A. In Poland by non-residents 
 
 
 
 
     
B. Abroad by residents 
 
 
 
 
 
RESTRICTED with few exceptions (non-residents are 
allowed to purchase apartments and up to 0.4 ha in rural 
areas without getting any permit, other investments need 
to be authorized by the Ministry of Interior) 
 
 
For business purposes – liberalized since 01.02.1996 
For private purposes allowed up to euro 50 thousands 
since 01.02.1996. Exceptions for Polish diplomatic 
offices. 
 
IV. OPERATIONS IN SECURITIES ON 
CAPITAL MARKETS 
A.  Admission of domestic securities on a foreign 
capital market 
1.  Issue through placing or public sale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Introduction on a recognized foreign 
security market  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Restricted until the beginning of 1997. 
25% of the emission value of public traded companies 
liberalized after 4.02.1997, and 100% liberalised after 
12.01.1999, with the exception of short-term securities.  
The residents were allowed to issue debt securities with 
the maturity longer than 1 year and to trade them since 1 
April 1996. 
 
The resstriction applies only to securities in public trading; 
issued on the Polish market (it should have ceased to apply 
by the end of 1999). Other securities may be introduced. 
B. Admission of foreign securities on the domestic  
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capital market 
1. Issue through placing or public sale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Introduction on a recognized domestic 
security market 
 
 
C. Operations in Poland by non-residents 
1. Purchase 
 
 
 
 
2. Sale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Operations abroad by residents 
1. Purchase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Sale  
 
 
 
 
As of 1 April 1996 non-residents were allowed to issue 
or sale in Poland debt securities which were approved by 
the Securities Commission, collective investment 
securities included up to ECU 200 mln and with maturity 
longer than 1 year. This ceiling was raised up to ECU 
300 mln for 1997 and up to ECU 400 mln for 1998. The 
money transfers should be permitted by the NBP. 
Free under the new foreign exchange law since 01.1999 
(the only restriction applies to mortgage debt bonds) 
 
 
 
Since 01.02.1996 the restriction concerned the debt 
securities not issued on the Polish market. The securities 
issued on the Polish market were treated as those 
described above. 
 
The restriction applied only to the purchase of shares and 
other securities of a participating nature, which may be 
affected by regulations on foreign direct investment. 
 
 
Non-residents were allowed to sell on the Polish market 
the participation units in the collective investment funds 
and stock of the companies registered in the OECD 
countries and other countries with which Poland 
concluded bilateral investment protection treaties. The 
stock needed a prior permission for public trade issued 
by the Securities Commission. The ceilings for such 
trade were set up at ECU 200 mln as of 1 April 1996 and 
raised up to ECU 300 mln as of 4 February 1997 and to 
ECU 400 mln for 1998. 
Free under the new Foreign Exchange Law. 
 
 
Since 01.02.1996 – partial liberalization – concerning 
securities from the OECD countries located enterprises, 
up to ECU 1 mln purchasing value and with maturity 
longer than 1 year. Further liberalization since 04. 
02.1997 lifting the value ceiling. 
Free under the new Foreign Exchange Law.  
 
The sale of securities listed under C was free as of 
01.02.1996 
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V. OPERATIONS ON MONEY MARKETS        
 
 
A. Admission of domestic securities and other 
instruments on a foreign money market 
1. Issue through placing or public sale 
2. Introduction on a recognised foreign money 
market 
 
B. Admission of foreign securities and other 
instruments on the domestic money market 
1. Issue through placing or public sale 
2. Introduction on a recognised domestic 
money market 
 
C. Operations in Poland by non-residents 
1. Purchase of money market securities 
2. Sale of money market securities 
3. Lending through other money market 
instruments 
4. Borrowing through other money market 
instruments 
 
D. Operations abroad by residents 
1. Purchase of money market securities 
2. Sale of money market securities 
3. Lending through other money market 
instruments 
4. Borrowing through other money market 
instruments 
RESTRICTED, but with the exemption of the authorised 
resident banks and if the Ministry of Finance allows non-
residents to purchase state bonds (should be always 
mentioned in the prospect). 
 
Allowed for authorized resident banks only 
Allowed for authorized resident banks only 
 
 
Not allowed  
 
 
 
 
 
Liberalized (1999) 
Liberalized (1999) 
Allowed for authorized resident banks only 
 
Allowed for authorized resident banks only 
 
 
 
Allowed for authorized resident banks only 
 
 
Allowed for authorized resident banks only 
 
Allowed for authorized resident banks only 
 
VI. OTHER OPERATIONS IN NEGOTIABLE 
INSTRUMENTS AND NON-SECURITISED 
CLAIMS             
A. Admission of domestic instruments and claims 
on a foreign financial market 
1. Issue through placing or public sale 
2. Introduction on a recognised foreign 
financial market 
 
B. Admission of foreign instruments and claims on 
a domestic financial market 
1. Issue through placing or public sale 
2. Introduction on a recognised financial 
market 
 
C. Operations in Poland by non-residents 
1. Purchase 
2. Sale 
3. Exchange for other assets 
 
D. Operations abroad by residents 
1. Purchase 
2. Sale 
 
3. Exchange for other assets 
RESTRICTED (where not mentioned otherwise) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Free as of 12 January 1999 concerning the securities 
quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, CTO and Polish 
Financial Exchange in Warsaw 
 
 
Allowed for authorized resident banks  
The residents are allowed to sell abroad non-securitised 
claims and negotiable instruments.  
Allowed for authorized resident banks   
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VII. OPERATIONS IN COLLECTIVE 
INVESTMENT SECURITIES 
A. Admission of domestic collective securities on a 
foreign securities market 
1. Issue through placing or public sale 
2. Introduction on a recognised foreign 
securities market 
 
B. Admission of foreign collective investment 
securities on the domestic securities market 
1. Issue through placing or public sale 
2. Introduction on a recognised domestic 
securities market 
 
C. Operations in Poland by non-residents: 
1. Purchase 
2. Sale 
 
D. Operations abroad by residents 
1. Purchase 
2. Sale 
3. Exchange for other assets abroad by 
residents 
 
 
Free under the Law on Investment Funds and the  
New Foreign Exchange Law (1999) 
 
 
 
 
Free under the new Foreign Exchange Law (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
Free under the new Foreign Exchange Law (1999) 
 
 
 
Free as of 4 February1997 
VIII. CREDITS DIRECTLY LINKED WITH 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS OR WITH THE 
RENDERING OF INTERNATIONAL 
SERVICES 
 
In case where a resident participates in the 
underlying commercial or service transaction 
A. Credits granted by non-residents to residents 
B. Credits granted by residents to non-residents 
 
In cases where no resident participates in the 
underlying commercial or service transaction 
A. Credits granted by non-residents to residents 
Credits granted by residents to non-residents 
Liberalised since May 1, 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IX. FINANCIAL CREDITS AND LOANS 
A. Credits and loans granted by non-residents to 
residents 
 
 
 
B. Credits and loans granted by residents to non-
residents 
 
A and B liberalised since 01.04.1996 but for credits with 
maturity longer than 1 year only (as of 1 April 1996 
shorter credits are allowed by authorized resident banks 
only) 
 
Restricted are the credits which result in debt in Polish 
currency, exceeding the equivalent of EURO 50.000 and 
whose maturity is shorter than one year 
X. SURETIES, GUARANTEES AND 
FINANCIAL BACK-UP FACILITIES 
In cases directly related to international trade or 
international current invisible operations, or in 
cases related to international capital movement 
operations in which a resident participates. 
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A. Sureties and guarantees: 
1. By non-residents in favour of residents 
2. By residents in favour of non-residents 
 
 
 
B. Financial back-up facilities: 
1. By non-residents in favour of residents 
2. By residents in favour of non-residents 
 
In cases not directly related to international trade, 
international current invisible operations or 
international capital movement operations or where 
no resident participates in the underlying 
international operation concerned 
A. Sureties and guarantees 
1. By non-residents in favour of residents 
2. By residents in favour of non-residents 
 
B. Financial back up facilities 
 
Free as of 1 April 1996 
The residents were allowed to issue guarantees on credits 
and loans for non-residents since 1 January 1996 and on 
obligations concerning international trade and capital 
operations since 4 February 1997. 
Restricted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Free under the new Foreign Exchange Law 
  
 
Restricted 
Allowed for authorized resident banks, only 
XI. OPERATION OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS 
A. Operation by non-residents of accounts with 
resident institutions: 
1. In domestic currency 
 
 
 
 
 
2. In foreign currency 
 
B. Operation by residents of accounts with non-
resident institutions 
1. In domestic currency 
2. In foreign currency 
 
 
 
Restricted for: 
- The deposits exceeding 500.000 PLN and of maturity 
shorter than 3 month,  
- The exchange of Polish currency into the foreign ones 
if it originates from liquidating the long term deposits 
before 3 month from deposing them 
No restrictions, but documented transfers only 
 
 
Restricted  
Restricted with some exceptions concerning:  resident 
authorized banks, residents while abroad, representative 
offices of resident enterprises if the deposit is used to 
cover these offices` expenses, resident enterprises` 
branches abroad if the deposit is used to cover these 
branches operating costs, deposits made with authorised 
investment abroad 
XII. OPERATIONS IN FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE 
A. In Poland by non-residents 
1. Purchase of domestic currency with 
foreign currency 
2. Sale of domestic currency for foreign 
currency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Free as of 1 January 1990  
 
Free as of 01.01.1990  
There are restrictions on transfers of foreign exchange up 
to euro 5.000 in cash by individuals and up to euro 20 
000 by the companies accompanied by the bank 
certificate for the non-resident carrying the cash abroad. 
The remaining transfers must be done via banks and 
connected with the underlying transactions. The 
forwards, swaps, hedging transactions are restricted. 
Authorized banks are allowed to do them.  
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3. Exchange of foreign currencies 
 
B.   Abroad by residents 
1. Purchase of foreign currency with 
domestic currency 
 
2. Sale of foreign currency for domestic 
currency 
3. Exchange of foreign currencies 
Free as of 1 January 1990 
 
 
Free under the new Foreign Exchange Law (12.01.1999), 
the reservation applies to purchases not linked to any 
particular underlying transaction only. 
Free under the new Foreign Exchange Law 
Free as of 1 January 1990 
 
XIII. LIFE ASSURANCE 
Capital transfers arising under life assurance 
contracts 
A. Transfers of capital and annuities certain due to 
resident beneficiaries from non-resident insurers 
B.  Transfers of capital and annuities certain due to 
non-resident beneficiaries from resident insurers 
Liberalised since 12.01.1999 by the new Foreign 
Exchange Act (art. 4 p.4) 
XIV. PERSONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
A. Loans 
B. Gifts and endowments 
C. Dowries 
D. Inheritances and legacies 
E. Settlement of debts in their country of origin 
by immigrants 
F. Emigrants` assets 
G. Gaming 
H. Savings on non-resident workers 
 
Liberalised since 27 March 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XV. PHYSICAL MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL 
ASSETS 
A. Securities and other documents of title to 
capital assets: 
1. Import 
2. Export 
 
 
 
 
B. Means of payment: 
1. Import 
2. Export 
 
 
 
Free  
Resident had the right to export shares and other 
securities of a participating nature denominated in the 
Polish currency since 1 February 1996. Export of other 
securities was liberalized by the new Foreign Exchange 
Law 
 
 
Free 
Free  
XVI. DISPOSAL OF NON-RESIDENT-
OWNED BLOCKED FUNDS 
A. Transfer of blocked funds 
 
B. Use of blocked funds in Poland 
1. For operations of a capital nature 
2. For current operations 
 
C. Cession of blocked funds between non-residents 
Fully liberalized  
Source: Sadowska-Cieślak (2001). 
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ANNEX B 
The Relationship Between the Real Exchange Rate, Current Account Balance in 
Poland, and Capital Inflows, 1995-1999. 
 
 
The following simple regressions have been tested for two measures of the exchange rate 
with respect to current account balance (CA) and inflows of non-FDI capital (PIOC): 
 RER = a + b CA + c PIOC      (A1) 
 DEV = d + e CA + f PIOC      (A2) 
where RER is the index of real exchange rate (PPI-deflated, January 1991=100), and DEV is 
the average monthly deviation of the nominal exchange rate from central parity.  As the time 
series for RER, DEV and CA show high non-stationarity of order one and the Johansen test 
for cointegration has yielded ambiguous results, it was decided to use first differences for 
non-stationary variables.  The estimation has been done for two periods: January 1996 – 
October 1999, and January 1997 – October 1999.  The results obtained are shown in Table 
A1: 
Table A1 
Regression results on the relationship between exchange rate changes, current account 
balance and inflows of non-FDI capital 
Period Exchange 
rate 
variable 
Constant D(CA) PIOC 
 
R^2 F(stat) DW No of 
observ. 
01/96-10/99 ∆RER 0.433 
(2.92) 
0.00013 
(0.44)
-0.00078 
(-3.48) 
0.225 6.11 1.76 45
01/97-10/99 ∆RER 0.536 
(2.62) 
0.00014 
(0.38)
-0.00088 
(-3.01) 
0.232 4.54 1.81 33
01/96-10/99 ∆DEV 0.569 
(2.14) 
-2.4E-06 
((-0.05)
-0.00128 
(-3.21) 
0.196 5.13 1.67 45
01/97-10/99 ∆DEV 0.843 
(2.32) 
6.8E-05 
(0.11)
-0.00168 
(-3.23) 
0.258 5.22 1.78 33
Source: Own calculations 
 
The results for different specifications are quite similar.  First, the tested relationship is 
statistically very weak and does not allow for any robust conclusion.  Second, changes in the 
current account balance seem to have no impact on the (contemporaneous) changes in the 
exchange rate, real or nominal.  Third, non-FDI capital inflows seem to be of some 
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importance, as suggested by t-statistics and coefficient signs, but the relationship may vary 
over time. 
Equations (A1) and (A2) have next been tested for causality between the two measures of 
the exchange rate, current account balance and non-FDI capital inflows.  Table A2 shows 
only the positive results of Granger causality test for various lags and various pairs of 
variables – i.e. only those pairwise cases for which the null hypothesis of no causality can be 
rejected at 10% confidence level.  As can be seen, no clear causality can be detected between 
the exchange rate changes and the exogenous variables.  In sum, neither current account 
balance nor non-FDI capital inflows seem to be primary responsible for the variations of the 
exchange rate in Poland in 1996-1999. 
Table A2 
Selected results for Granger causality test for RER, DEV, CA and PIOC. 
Lags 
(months) 
Null hypothesis No. of 
observations 
F(statistics) Probability 
2 RER does not 
cause CA 
44 3.294 0.048 
 CA does not cause 
RER 
 1.665 0.202 
  6 PIOC does not 
cause CA 
40 2.405 0.054 
 CA does not cause 
PIOC 
 1.215 0.329 
  9 PIOC does not 
cause CA 
37 3.253 0.016 
 CA does not cause 
PIOC 
 0.739 0.670 
12 DEV does not 
cause CA 
34 2.633 0.077 
 CA does not cause 
DEV 
 1.760 0.201 
Source: Own calculations. 
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ANNEX C 
Stationarity of Deviations of the Exchange Rate from Central Parity 
Daily observations of deviations of the “fixing” (central bank) exchange rate from central 
parity have been tested for stationarity with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test.  The results in 
Table B1 show that while for all years the deviation levels are not stationary, first differences 
are unambiguously stationary.  This suggests a strong presence of systematic structural 
factors behind foreign exchange rate movements.  It can also be seen that the role of the 
random walk factor gradually increases with time.  
Table B1 
ADF test results for stationarity of deviations of the “fixing” exchange rate from central 
parity, May 1995 – November 1999. 
Year No of daily  Critical values 
 Observations Levels 1st differences 
Critical values 
1995 153 -1.833 -4.378 1%: -3.474 
    5%: -2.880 
    10%: -2.577 
1996 245 -1.449 -7.899 1%: -3.459 
    5%: -2.873 
    10%: -2.573 
1997 246 -2.038 -8.407 1%: -3.459 
    5%: -2.873 
    10%: -2.573 
1998 250 -2.125 -6.693 1%: -3.458 
    5%: -2.873 
    10%: -2.573 
1999 225 -2.338 -7.382 1%: -3.462 
    5%: -2.874 
    10%: -2.574 
Source: Own calculations 
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